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harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we
compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in
Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate
countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the
candidates. Finally, we use insights from case studies of subcontractor agreements in
the car industry to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European
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enforcement. Our conclusion targets an underdeveloped competition culture as
primary culprit for limits to effective – as opposed to merely legal – harmonis tion of
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11 Introduction
Rules matter. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council specified that candidate
countries for EU accession must adjust their administrative structures, “so that
European Community legislation transposed into national legislation is implemented
effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.” When
accession negotiations with the first group of applicant countries started in March
1998, the EC Commission split up the acquis communautaire nto individual chapters
and organised bilateral screenings in which it asked the negotiating teams from
Central Europe whether
· they could accept the relevant chapter of the acquis
· they had already adopted the laws necessary to comply with the acquis
· if not, when they intended to adopt such laws
· whether they possessed the administrative structures and other capacity to
implement and enforce EU laws properly
· if not, when these structures would be put into place.
In other words, only when the process of rule harmonisation is complete, will
accession happen. Many of the negotiating chapters are already closed. Among the
more difficult that remain open is Chapter 6, competition policy. The Commission’s
plan is to negotiate the conditions for membership relating to Chapter 6 in the second
part of 2001, with a view provisionally to close it. It plans to focus particularly on
state aid. Given the history of soft budget constraints in Eastern Europe, this is not
surprising. What is surprising is that formal rule alignment features more prominently
in EU monitoring than either rule enforcement or rule receptivity by local (i.e. non-
EU) subjects (see also Fingleton et al., 1996, chap.9).
This paper explains why this is a problem. Within competition law and policy it
focuses on vertical restraints, because this is an area that receives more attention in
the EU than in the candidate countries, so it lends itself to a litmus test of whether
harmonisation is effective or just an approximation of words. The paper thus adds to
the sparse literature covering implementation experience in transition countries (cf.
Dutz & Vagliasindi, 2000; Hoekman & Djankov, 2000). Section 2 describes the rules
governing vertical agreements in EU competition law. It also covers the rules
pertaining to the relationship between the EU and the candidate countries of Eastern
Europe. Section 3 characterises similarities and differences between EU and East
European competition rules. It discusses how the Commission interprets competition
policy harmonisation and suggests what may be wrong with its approach. Section 4
produces evidence of anti-competitive b ha iour between domestic and foreign firms
in East Europe’s emerging automotive sector. Section 5 concludes.
2 The legal regime towards vertical agreements in the EU and in the
Europe Agreements
The EU has recently changed its legal regime towards vertical agreements by
attempting a more economics-based, less legal-form based, approach towards their
assessment. At the same time, the Europe Agreements consider the approximation of
competition laws one of the areas that are particularly important for the candidate
countries’ economic integration into the European Community (Van den Bossche,
21997, p. 25). This means that vertical agreements will be assessed according to
criteria based on Articles 81 and maybe 82 of the EC Treaty at the very latest when
EC conform rules have been implemented in the candidate countries. This section
gives an overview of the current legal regime towards vertical agreements in order
later to use this to assess the conformity of the candidate countries’ competition
policy, both in terms of substantive law and practice. We end the section by outlining
briefly the conditions of the Europe Agreements in this respect.
The basis of the following is mainly Art. 81 of the EC Treaty dealing with
agreements although Art. 82 prohibiting the abuse of domination is also partially
relevant. We base the overview mainly on the EU Commission’s interpretation of the
new regime as expounded in its “Guidelines on Vertical Restraints” (Commission
Notice, OJ C 291, 13.10.2000, pp. 1-44).
2.1 The current EU regime towards vertical agreements
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits agreements, including vertical agreements, if
they
1. affect trade between Member States, and
2. prevent, restrict, or distort competition.
Such vertical agreements are referred to as vertical restraints (VRs) and these are
automatically void. However, vertical agreements may be exempted from the
prohibition if their benefits outweigh the anticompetitive costs. This is according to
Art. 81(3) that allows the antitrust authority to declare Art. 81(1) inapplicable if (and
only if) the agreement:
1. contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress,
2. while allowing the consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and does not
3. impose unnecessary restrictions for the attainment of these objectives;
4. allow the parties to eliminate competition for a substantial part of the products.
The European Commission has adopted Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999 of 22
December 1999 on the application of article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of
vertical agreements and concerted practices (OJ L 336, 29.12.1999, p. 21), the Block
Exemption Regulation (BER). The BER exempts from Art. 81(1) vertical agreements
provided that the market share of the supplier does not exceed 30 percent of the
relevant market. However, in the case of exclusive supply obligations, the exemption
is granted provided the market share of the buyerdoes not exceed 30 percent of the
relevant input market.
Blacklisted are
a) resale price maintenance
b) agreements that have as their objective the restriction of sales by the buyer to
customers according to territory or otherwise (subject to four exceptions)
c) restrictions of active or passive sales to end users by members of a selective
distribution system
d) restrictions of cross-supplies between distributors within a selective distribution
system
3e) restrictions agreed between a supplier of components and a buyer who
incorporates these components which prevents end-users, independent repairers
and service providers from obtaining spare parts directly from the supplier.
Vertical agreements between firms with a market share of less than 10 percent of
the relevant market are generally considered to fall outside the scope of Art. 81(1)
according to the Commission’s de minimis notice (Notice on agreements of minor
importance of 9 December 1997, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 13). Thus the BER really
has effect on vertical agreements between firms with a market share of between 10
and 30 percent. Vertical agreements relating to all intermediate and final goods and
services are covered except distribution of automobiles that is covered by a specific
block exemption (Commission regulation (EC) No. 1475/1995, see OJ L 145,
29.6.1995, p. 25). This block exemption is currently under review (see e.g. European
Commission, 2000k).
In general, the BER does not apply to vertical agreements falling within the scope
of any other block exemption (see “Guidelines on Vertical Restraints” at par. 45). In
addition to the block exemption on car distribution, this means that the BER does not
apply to vertical agreements covered by Commission regulation (EC) No. 240/96 on
technology transfer (see OJ L 31, 9.2.1996, p. 2). However, some intellectual property
rights (IPRs) also fall within the scope of the BER. Article 2(3) of the BER includes
vertical agreements containing certain clauses on IPRs assigned to the buyers and
thereby excludes from the BER all other vertical agreements containing IPR clauses.
There are three sets of rules that may apply to vertical agreements containing IPR
clauses:
1. BER Art. 2(3)
2. Commission regulation (EC) No. 240/96 on technology transfer
3. The Commission Notice of 18.12.1978 concerning its assessment of certain
subcontracting agreements in relation to Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty (OJ C 1,
3.1.1979, p.2)
According to the Commission, the BER complements the technology transfer
regulation and the notice on subcontracting. The Commission opines that Art. 2(3) of
the BER means that “the Block Exemption Regulation does not apply when the IPRs
are provided by the buyer to the supplier, no matter whether the IPRs concern the
manner of manufacture or of distribution. An agreement relating to the transfer of
IPRs to the supplier and containing possible restrictions on the sales made by the
supplier is not covered by the Block Exemption Regulation. This means in particular
that subcontracting involving the transfer of know-how to a subcontractor does not
fall within the scope of application of the Block Exemption Regulation. However,
vertical agreements under which the buyer provides only specifications to the supplier
which describe the goods or services to be supplied are covered by the Block
Exemption Regulation” (“Guidelines on Vertical Restraints” at par. 33).
We now go through each of the three sets of mutually exclusive rules on
technology transfer and know-how and vertical restraints. We do so starting
chronologically with the Notice on Subcontracting, proceeding to the Regulation on
Technology Transfer and ending with the BER rules.
42.1.1 Notice on Subcontracting
The 1978 Notice on Subcontracting represents the Commission's views on
subcontracting and is thus not legally binding. It does however provide a guideline for
how the Commission will evaluate such vertical agreements and it is fair to assume
that the Commission still adheres to its old view since it is explicitly mentioned in the
2000 "Guidelines on Vertical Restraints" at par. 33. Furthermore, it is to be expected
(Fejø, 1997, p. 218) that the European Court of Justice in the interest of legal certainty
will respect the Notice insofar as no significant opposing considerations take effect.
The next two paragraphs define subcontracting agreements and provide the economic
rationale for the exemption of the agreement from Art. 81(1):
"The Commission considers that agreements under which one firm, called 'the
contractor', … entrusts to another, called the 'sub-contractor', the manufacture of
goods, the supply of services or the performance of work under the contractor's
instructions, to be provided to the contractor or performed on his behalf, are not of
themselves caught by the prohibition in Article 85(1) [now 81(1)].
To carry out certain subcontracting agreements in accordance with the
contractor's instructions, the subcontractor may have to make use of particular
technology or equipment which the contractor will have to provide. In order to protect
the economic value of such technology or equipment, the contractor may wish to
restrict their use by the subcontractor to whatever is necessary for the purpose of the
agreement. The question arises whether such restrictions are caught by Article
[81(1)]. They are assessed in this notice with due regard to the purpose of such
agreements, which distinguishes them from ordinary patent and know-how licensing
agreements." (Commission Notice of 18.12.1978 concerning its assessment of certain
subcontracting agreements in relation to Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty (OJ C 1,
3.1.1979, p.2)).
According to the Notice, Art. 81(1) does not apply to provisions
· restricting the use of equipment or technology made available by the
contractor for the purposes of the agreement;
· forbidding the subcontractor to make such equipment or technology available
to third parties; and
· imposing on the subcontractor the obligation to supply exclusively to the
contractor the goods, services or work resulting from the use of the technology
or equipment.
Such restrictions are allowed if the equipment or technology are necessary for the
subcontractor to carry out the agreement. Equipment or technology are judged
necessary if
a) it is necessary for the subcontractor to use industrial property rights, know-how,
studies or plans, dice, patterns, tools or accessory equipment which distinctively
belong to the contractor, and
b) "which permit the manufacture of goods which differ in form, function or
composition from other goods manufactured or supplied on the market",
c) provided the subcontractor does not have easy alternative access to the equipment
or technology needed to carry out the job.
The latter "is the case when the contractor provides no more than general information
which merely describes the work to be done. In such circumstances the restriction
5could deprive the subcontractor of the possibility of developing his own business in
the fields covered by the agreement" (Notice on subcontracting; see also Van Bael
and Bellis, 1987, pp. 207-8).
Other restrictions that are considered as being outside the scope of Art. 81(1)
are secrecy obligations protecting know-how and confidential information; post-term
bans on use of manufacturing processes and know-how; non-exclusive grant-backs for
improvements and new applications when they cannot be used independently of the
contractor's secret know-how or patents; and restrictions on the sub-contractor's use of
the contractor's trade marks, trade names or get-up.
In sum, the Notice on Subcontracting applies when the buyer transfers
equipment or know-how to the seller in order that the seller can provide the buyer
with goods or services that differ from those found already on the market. The buyer
may then restrict the use of the equipment or know-how and request that the seller
supply the contract goods exclusively to the buyer, provided that the equipment or
know-how is necessary.
2.1.2 Regulation (EC) No. 240/96 on Technology Transfer
The 1996 Commission Regulation (EC) 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application
of Article 81(3) of the treaty to certain categories of technology transfer (OJ L31,
09.02.1996, pp. 2-13) deals with agreements and concerted practices which include
restrictions imposed in relation to the acquisition or use of industrial property rights or
know-how. It applies to the licensing of patents (‘pure’ patent licensing agreements),
licensing of non-patented technical information (‘pure’ know-how licensing
agreements) and to combined patent and know-how licensing agreements (‘mixed’
agreements). For a history and critical overview of the regulation, see Robertson
(1996).
The objective of the regulation is to facilitate the dissemination of technology
and the improvement of manufacturing processes by giving the licensor sufficient
incentives to license her technology or know-how, and by giving the licensee
sufficient incentives to invest in complementary assets required in order to
“manufacture, use and put on the market a new product or to use a new process.”
Article 1 thus exempts from Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty pure patent licensing
agreements, pure know-how licensing agreements and mixed agreements to which
only two undertakings are party and which include one or more of eight different
obligations. These basically amount to exclusive licensing agreements in which the
licensor is obliged not to use the licensed technology in the licensed territory himself
or not to grant further lic nces there. The licensor may also restrict the licensee’s
active or passive sales into other licensees’ territories. The exemption “is granted only
to the extent that and for as long as the licensed product is protected by parallel
patents” or in the case of restrictions on passive sales for a period not exceeding five
years. Pure know-how licensing agreements may be exempted for a maximum of ten
years.
6Article 2 contains a white list of eighteen types of clauses that can safely be
put into a licensing agreement: secrecy obligations, post-term use bans, grant-back
clauses, minimum quality specifications, specifications of royalties, ‘most-favoured
licensee’ clauses etc. White-listed is also an obligation on the licensee to restrict her
exploitation of the licensed technology technically or product-wise. Article 3 then
contains a black list of seven situations that are not exempted: price fixing, resale
price maintenance, and refusals to deal with parallel traders or that otherwise obstruct
parallel trade, and other restrictions on manufacturing, sales and innovations.
The Regulation defines patents rather broadly as including patent applications,
utility models, applications for registration of utility models, topographies of
semiconductor products, (applications for) certificates d’utilité and certificates
d’addition under French law, supplementary protection certificates e.g. for medicinal
products and plant breeders’ certificates. Know-how is defined as a body of technical
information that is secret, substantial and identified. By secret is meant that it is not
generally known or easily accessible, while substantial refers to the significance for
the licensee’s competitive situation. That the information is identified means that the
know-how should be described or recorded in such a way as to make it possible to
verify the criteria of secrecy and substantiality.
In sum, the Regulation on Technology Transfer Agreements applies when a
licensor transfers the right to use a patent or know-how to a licensee in order that the
licensee can exploit the technology to manufacture, use or “put on the market” new
goods or services. The licensor may then restrict the use of the license and promise
that the licensee will not face intra-brand competition in her own territory.
2.1.3 Block Exemption Regulation Art. 2(3)
Article 2(3) of the BER extends the general exemption of vertical agreements in Art.
2(1) to "vertical agreements containing provisions which relate to the assignment to
the buyer or use by the buyer of intellectual property rights, provided that
a) those provisions do not constitute the primary objective of such agreements and
b) are directly related to the use, sale or resale of goods or services by the buyer or its
customers."
This rule thus applies to technology transfer moving in the opposite direction of
that relating to the Notice on Subcontracting. The purpose of the rule is to allow
"vertical agreements where the use, sale or resale of goods or services can be
performed more effectively because IPRs are assigned to or transferred for use by the
buyer" ("Guidelines on vertical restraints", par. 31). To qualify for the exemption, the
IPR provisions must satisfy five conditions ("Guidelines", par. 30):
1. They must be part of a genuine vertical agreement;
2. They must be assigned to, or for use by, the buyer;
3. They must not constitute the primary objective of the agreement;
4. They must be directly related to the use, sale or resale of goods or services by the
buyer or his customers.
5. They must not contain restrictions of competition having the same object or effect
as vertical restraints that are not exempted under the BER.
7The first condition ensures that the IPRs appear in the context of purchasing or
distributing goods rather than in the context of assigning or licensing IPRs. The
"Guidelines" for example explicitly mention (par. 32) as an example not covered by
the BER, "agreements under which one party provides another party with a mould or
a master copy and licenses the other party to produce and distribute copies". The
second condition clarifies that the flow of technology is from the supplier to the
buyer, and not from the buyer to the supplier (as in the Notice on Subcontracting).
The third condition makes clear (much like the first) that the purpose of the agreement
must be the purchase or distribution of goods, not the assignment or licensing of IPRs.
The fourth condition requires there to be a link between the assignment of the IPR and
the facilitation of use, sale or resale of goods or services by the buyer or his
customers. The fifth condition ensures that you cannot circumvent the BER by means
of introducing IPRs in the vertical agreements.
IPRs which may be "considered to serve the implementation of vertical





The "Guidelines" (par. 42) mention franchise agreements, with the exception of
industrial franchise agreements, as "the most obvious example where know-how for
marketing purposes is communicated to the buyer." However, the "Guidelines" are
silent as to the application of Art. 2(3) of the BER further upstream.
In sum, the BER exempts from Art. 81(1) vertical agreements which transfer
IPRs from a supplier to a buyer in order to facilitate use, sale or resale of the contract
good or service.
2.2 The Europe Agreements
At the time of writing the European Community has Europe Agreements with ten
countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
These agreements include competition provisions and establish that a major
precondition for the candidate country’s economic integration into the EC is the
approximation of that country's existing and future legislation to that of the EC. One
of the areas into which the approximation of laws “shall extend in particular” is  rules
on competition.
In addition, the agreements prohibit restrictive agreements and abuse of
dominance insofar as they affect trade between the EC and the candidate country:
“The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so
far as they may affect trade between the Community and [the candidate country]:
 i. all agreements of cooperative or concentrative nature between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices between
undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition;
8 ii. abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the territories of the
Community or of [the candidate country] as a whole or in a substantial part
thereof; …”
Practices are to be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the application of the
rules of Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The Association Council has three years
to implement the competition rules.
Tóth (1998) gives a fascinating account of the effect of the Europe
Agreements on the harmonisation of Hungarian competition law. He argues that the
Europe Agreements’ provisions regarding restrictive practices and abuse of dominant
positions that affect trade between the candidate country and the EU must be seen as
“soft law” for a number of reasons and that not even the implementing rules can be
seen as giving direct effect of this article of the Europe Agreements, since the
implementing rules foresee that both competition authorities should proceed on the
basis of their own substantive legislation. Tóth further argues that a candidate country
has an obligation to harmonise competition rules while Member States are free to
choose a different legislation. This implies that a candidate country might in theory
choose to re-optimise its competition policy, once accession has occurred.
In sum, the candidate countries must copy Art. 81(1) and Art. 82 from the EC
Treaty. However, it is noteworthy that the Europe Agreements do not mention an
equivalent of Art. 81(3) allowing for the exemptions of the agreements (see Van Den
Bossche, 1997, p. 32, and Tóth, 1998, p. 361). However, it appears that the candidate
countries have copied not only Articles 81 and 82 in their national competition acts
but also the various block exemptions.
3 Competition policy in the candidate countries
The broad outlines of competition policy in the candidate countries are very – and
increasingly – similar to EU law (for references to candidate country competition
laws, see final section of reference list as well as Musil (1996) on the Czech Republic;
Tóth (1998) on Hungary; Virtanen (2000) on Lithuania; and B as (1995) on
Slovakia). In this sense at least there is little difference between the candidate
countries in the fast lane to EU membership and those that are in for the long haul. All
ten countries have a general prohibition on restrictive agreements, often verbatim
following Art.81(1), and apply the de minimis rule. They also all allow for exemptions
from the prohibition of restrictive agreements, again mirroring the letter and the spirit
of Art.81(3). Their laws provide for block exemptions much as in EU practice,
although this is one of the less harmonised areas of the law. For example, while all
candidate countries except Bulgaria and Slovakia have a block exemption specifically
on technology transfer agreements, so far only Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia have
adopted a block exemption on vertical restraints. Further, none have issued a notice
on subcontracting; however, this does not mean a lack of harmonisation but only that
the candidate countries have not found it necessary to clarify their understanding of
this particular aspect of inter-firm agreements.
9Table 1.— Share of Vertical Restraints in Total Case Load
Country Year Practice RA/TCL VR/TCL
Bulgaria 1999-2000 Decisions 11/132 = 8%a 8/156=5%b
Czech Republic2000 Decisions 26/104 = 25%20/104 = 19%
Estonia 1998-9 Investigations 17/190 = 9% ~ 0
Hungary 1998-2000 Investigations ~ 15% 0
Latvia 1999 Investigations 5/48 = 10% ~ 0
Lithuania 1997-8 Infringements 11/37 = 30% 0
Poland 1996-2000 Decisions .. 25/86 = 29%
Romania 1999 Decisions 312/472=66% 38/472=8%c
Slovakia 1999-2000 Investigations158/493 = 32%125/493=30%
Slovenia 1999 Investigations 7/54 = 13% 0
Note: RA = restrictive agreements; TCL = total case load; VR = vertical restraints.
a=1999;  b=2000; c=net of franchise agreements.
Source: Antimonopoly Office (Slovakia, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000)), Commission
(2000a-j), Competition Council (Lithuania (1998, 1999, 2000)), Estonian Competition
Board (1998, 1999), Office of Economic Competition (Hungary (1998, 1999, 2000)),
plus interviews with competition officials.
Candidate competition law differs in terms of notification requirements. The
rules are rather restrictive in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,
and Romania. Here all agreements, including those covered by block exemptions,
must be notified. Firms in Slovenia need to notify only agreements requiring
individual exemptions. For firms in Latvia only agreements that go beyond what is
exempted explicitly require notification. Poland and Slovakia have the most liberal
regimes; in Slovakia, only mergers need to be notified, and in Poland firms are only
expected to self-assess the agreements they are subject to in terms of the
antimonopoly law.
Caseloads and case history are good indicators for the general level of activity
of the competition authorities and for what the focus of their attention is.
Unfortunately, information from candidate country sources, interviews, and the
Commission often matches only approximately. What is evident is that while the
share of total caseload dedicated to restrictive agreements is not so low, there have
been hardly any investigations of vertical restraints (see Table 1). 17 of the 20 Czech
cases had to do with exclusive sale or purchasing, and with franchises. In Romania, of
the 312 cases 19 dealt with exclusive distribution, 17 with exclusive purchasing, 274
with franchising, and only two referred to technology and/or know-how transfer. In
Slovakia, the relative prominence of restrictive agreements fell from 44 per cent to 16
per cent in 1999-2000, and that of VRs from 35 per cent to 13 per cent. Most of these
were multiple decisions concerning the retail outlets of the same five cosmetics
distributors. Hence exclusive agreements of the type analysed in this paper are not
prominent on the competition authorities’ agenda. This appears slowly to change. For
example, provisions on vertical restraints were inserted into the Lithuanian
competition law from 2000; subsequently firms notified 30 VRs all of which qualified
under the general exemption. Likewise in Slovenia, 4 out of 52 decisions concerned
VRs in 2000. By and large, the competition authorities in candidate countries have
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paid most attention to unfair competition, abuse of market dominance, and merger
control. In mature market economies competition authorities devote more time and
energy to horizontal than to vertical agreements, too. But surely not as little as
suggested by the information in Table 1.
In its latest annual progress reports reviewing the candidate countries’
readiness for EU accession, the Commission makes little use of this information
(Commission 2000a-j). It confirms that in all candidate countries, legislation is largely
(fully in the case of Slovenia) in line with the acquis although further progress is
necessary in view of developments in the acquis with respect to vertical restraints (i.e.
BER). The Commission identifies the application and enforcement of rules as the
principal challenge for competition policy in the candidate countries and admonishes
the competition authorities to concentrate on serious breaches of the law instead of on
what it interprets as often marginal infringements that are being investigated. But this
is not sufficient to prepare the candidate countries for membership. Our analysis in
section 4 shows that a harmonised legal apparatus plus a competent and vigilant
competition authority by themselves do not make for competitive markets. The
missing key ingredient is a sound competition culture by which we mean the
understanding of and commitment to the institution of markets by consumers and
producers.
Vertical agreements are a good test how far competition culture is developed,
more so than unfair competition, abuse of dominance, or merger control. When
someone counterfeits a brand, the affected party is likely to complain. Likewise, given
the history of state-owned monopolies, competition authorities in the transition
countries obviously look out for abusive monopolistic practices. And firms will notify
intended mergers because they cannot by kept out of the limelight anyway. But
vertical restraints can be, and are. The reason for this is that in distinguishing between
anti-competitive and pro-competitive agreements, the competition authority must  rely
on a higher measure of cooperation from the market participants involved. Tóth
(1998, p. 364), for example, is intrigued by the fact that although the new Hungarian
competition act called for notification, the Hungarian Competition Authority “did not
have to work itself into the ground by responding to hundreds of notifications.
Notwithstanding a few examples, statistics show that things stand now as if the law on
vertical restraints had not changed at all. The general ban on vertical competition
restrictions neither provoked hostile reactions from the business sphere, nor gave rise
to a mass of notifications seeking negative clearance or exemption.” Tóth speculates
whether this is due to Hungarian firms being unaware of the new rules or because
Hungarian firms do not engage in vertical restraints. We answer that question in the
next sections.
4 Subcontractor agreements in the car industry in the candidate countries
We conducted a survey of 413 car component suppliers' exposure to or use of vertical
agreements and technology transfer in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Among other questions, we asked them what type of
exclusivity they faced in their contracts, if any: if customers requested exclusivity of
the respondent firm (ECR); whether they requested exclusivity of their customer
(ERC); whether suppliers requested exclusivity of the respondent firm (ESR); and
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whether they requested exclusivity of their supplier (ERS). We also asked them if
they received technology from their customer (TTC) and whether they transferred
technology to their own supplier (TTS). For more information on the data, see
Lorentzen and Møllgaard (2000). Table 2 summarizes the findings on technology
transfer and use of exclusivity.
Table 2.—Summary of evidence on exclusive agreements and technology transfer
Number of different exclusive agreements
Technology transfer 0 1 2 3 4 TOTAL
0 56 38 9 10 3 116
1 75 45 17 7 3 147
2 80 32 18 13 5 148
TOTAL 211 115 44 30 11 411
Note: Number of observations reduced from 413 to 411 due to two missing values.
The table shows that 28 per cent (116 of 411) of the firms did not receive
technology from their customer nor did they transfer technology to their supplier. Yet
out of these 116 firms, only slightly less than half did not engage in exclusivity at all.
One third had experience with exactly one kind of exclusive agreements while 19 per
cent had experience with two or more kinds of exclusive agreements.
The table also demonstrates that there is no evident relationship between the
extent of technology transfer and the use of vertical agreements. Independently of
whether the respondent firm has no technology transfer, only one kind of technology
transfer (either TTC or TTS) or two kinds of technology transfer (both TTC and
TTS), roughly half the firms have no experience with exclusive agreements, 30 per
cent have experience with exactly one kind of exclusivity, while 20 per cent have
experience with two or more kinds of exclusivity. This result is confirmed in a
thorough econometric analysis using logit regressions (Lorentzen and Møllgaard,
2000).
There are country differences. Romanian firms are especially likely to receive
and transfer technology with no strings attached (no exclusive agreements). More than
half of our Romanian firms thus both receive technology from their customers and
transfer it to their suppliers without facing any exclusive agreements. (Refer to Table
A.1 of the appendix for country-specific evidence). At the other extreme, Hungarian
and Polish firms are more likely to face exclusive agreements without any technology
transfer than are firms in the other four countries. A quarter of our Hungarian firms
face one or more exclusive agreements without any technology transfer, while this
only happens to 15 per cent on average and only to eight per cent of our Slovene
firms. Our Polish and Czech firms are most likely to meet exclusivity in vertical
agreements, but in the Czech cases it is more easily defended by the simultaneous
occurrence of technology transfer. I terestingly, Planavova-Latanowicz and Harding
(1999) find that general awareness in relation to issues of competition policy is higher
in Poland than in the Czech Republic. This is suggested by country differences in case
load, in academic and public debate, and in changes and amendments of competition
rules. Our result on vertical restraints – that Polish firms use exclusive agreements
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without technology transfer –  could be explained by the Polish law providing for self-
assessments, and the other countries’ provisions requiring notification. It may also
show that general awareness of competition policy in "policy circles" is one thing;
making firms aware of specific competition rules is something else.
One might expect a customer that transfers technology (TTC) to request
exclusivity (ECR) from the receiver of technology in order to protect the transfer.
This would be in accordance with the thinking behind the legal framework outlined in
Section 2. Table 3 shows that 39 per cent of the firms that did not receive technology
from their customers nonetheless have faced requests of exclusivity from their
customers. At the same time 65 per cent of the firms that did receive technology from
their customers would do so without facing requests of exclusivity. This shows that
the very simple hypothesis is only true for at most 45 per cent of the sample. In the
rest of the cases, a more complicated explanation for technology transfer or use of
exclusivity is called for. This is where our case material fits in.
Table 3. – Use of ECR and TTC among the firms
Exclusivity requested by customer?
TT from customer? No Yes TOTAL
No 99 62 161
Yes 162 88 250
TOTAL 261 150 411
Note: Number of observations reduced from 413 to 411 due to two missing values.
Again we find country differences: On average, 15 per cent of our firms face
ECR restraints without receiving technology from their customer, but Polish and
Hungarian firms are more likely to experience this (20 per cent) than Romanian (as
little as four per cent) or Slovakian firms. (Consult Table A2 of the appendix for more
information on country differences in the combined use of ECR and TTC).
Similar to the TTC/ECR hypothesis, one might expect a respondent firm that
transfers technology to a supplier (TTS) to request that this supplier not sell the
products produced with this technology to the competitors of the respondent (ERS).
This would again be in line with the thinking behind the subcontractor notice we
discussed in Section 2. Table 4 shows that a little less that half of the firms transfer
technology to their suppliers and of these only nine per cent protect their technology
transfer using exclusive agreements. Six per cent of the firms request exclusivity of
their suppliers although no technology transfer has taken place. The simple hypothesis
only appears to be true for at most 55 per cent of the cases. For the rest of the cases, a
more complicated analysis is again called for, and we need the detailed cases for that.
Table 4.—Use of ERS and TTS among the firms
Exclusivity requested from supplier?
TT to supplier? No Yes TOTAL
No 207 13 220
Yes 175 18 193
TOTAL 382 31 413
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Again we find country differences: Polish and Hungarian firms are twice as likely
to request exclusivity without transferring technology than the average firm. And this
never happens in Romania or Slovakia and only rarely in the Czech Republic. (See
Table A3 of the Appendix for more country-specific information on this).
To throw light on the many situations where these two simple hypotheses about
the relationship between vertical restraints and technology transfer do not hold, we
contacted firms that had reported to use or to be exposed to exclusive agreements in
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. We assembled more than 30 case
studies. Semi-structured interviews in the four countries were held primarily in the
local language. They focused on
· the way in which technology transfer and vertical restraints are related;
· how firms bargain about exclusive agreements and how their bargaining position
is determined;
· the firm's knowledge of competition policy at the local and EU level.
The interviewed firms broadly fall into three categories. In the first group, firms
impose VRs to protect TT, thus confirming the hypotheses. In the second group, firms
transfer technology to their supplier. This requires the recipient firm to undertake
relationship-specific investment to be able to use the transferred technology. To
ensure itself against hold-up by the transferring firm, the supplier then imposes
exclusivity on the transferring firm. Thus, we experience TTS and ESR at the same
time, but this – as our simple hypotheses – is consistent with traditional economic
theory (Williamson, 1985, and Klein et al., 1978).
In the third group, firms do not transfer technology but demand exclusivity all the
same. We focus on these, potentially problematic cases in Section 4.2 below. Before
doing so, we briefly discuss the cases that fit our hypotheses in Section 4.1.
4.1 Vertical restraints with technology transfer
A Czech company of a "very complex and technologically intensive product" that
received technology from a final assembler confirms our hypothesis that exclusivity
may be used to protect intellectual property rights in the following way:
"… we cannot use the transferred technology to produce products for any
other firm except the one which gave us the technology – and the same holds
for our suppliers. The problem is that the current patent law is not sufficient to
protect the transferred technology."
The firm extends the same exclusivity clause to all its own suppliers. Thus it
seems that firms transfer not only technology upstream but also exclusive agreements.
This firm did not bargain about the exclusivity terms but did negotiate the penalty
from breaking it. The firm claims to be aware of national and EU rules on vertical
restrictions but does not think it violates these. For this reason it did not notify any
authorities about the VR although in our reading of the Czech rules on notification it
has to notify the authority (see Section 3). However, the firm added, "even if we
would feel like violating some regulation rules, we would never do it [notify], because
we would be immediately out of business."
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Another Czech producer of a "complex and technologically intensive product"
has agreed with its customers that it should not sell to their competitors (i.e. ECR). In
exchange the manufacturer receives technology and finds that this technology helps
improve what they are doing and how they are doing it. The technology could not
have been acquired on the open market "because the technology is very special". In
addition, the firm has negotiated that its customers do not buy rivals' products (i.e.
ERC). Thus the exclusivity seems to be reciprocal in this case. The firm has invested
in own research capacity. So, while the ECR can be perceived as protecting
technology transfer, the ERC can be perceived as protecting relation-specific
investment. This company is familiar with rules regarding vertical restraints but did
not find it necessary to notify the authorities.
4.2 Vertical restraints without technology transfer: de minimis?
A small Hungarian producer of brake hoses, a very simple product that is easily
copied from original equipment samples or acquired on the market, entered a contract
with a Danish trading company. The latter requested the Hungarian firm not to sell
outside Hungary except through the Danish company and that they not be present at
foreign trade fairs. The business with the Danish firm amounted to roughly 30 per
cent of their total turnover and as such was something the Hungarian firm could not
afford to lose. There was no technology transfer in the sense of the subcontractor
notice. The Danish firm would send the Hungarian firm original equipment samples
and request it to produce small runs of these products for the European aftermarket.
The Hungarian company is not familiar with competition rules concerning vertical
restraints and did not consider notifying competition authorities about the exclusivity,
although it found the agreement strange. In fact, it probably did not have to notify as it
probably would benefit from the de minimis rule. Their annual sales are about USD
500.000 which is likely less than one per cent of total turnover in the (after-)market
for brake hoses. However, since this is an exclusive supply obligation, under EU rules
(see Section 2) the market share of the buyer, i.e. of the Danish firm, would be the
relevant indicator. We have no information on this but think that it is unlikely that this
could be the Hungarian firm's problem.
4.3 Vertical restraints without technology transfer
A Czech producer of among other things central door locking systems, a simple
product, faces vertical restraints imposed by some of the suppliers of raw materials
(wires or connectors) not to buy from their competitors. How this should be treated
depends on the market share of these suppliers in their markets.
A Hungarian producer of components for buses and lorries entered an
agreement with a customer that has a very large market share.  After the contract for
delivery had been signed, the customer wrote to the producer: "We inform you of the
fact that the supplied product is our own product and you are not allowed to sell it but
through us." The producer opines that this product cannot be protected as it is
generally available on the world market and it is not covered by a patent. The
customer, however, has proprietory feelings towards it. Thus this is an interesting case
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in which the customer could claim (rightly or wrongly) that the agreement can be
interpreted positively in terms of the subcontractor notice while the producer would
contend that it cannot. The companies (both Hungarian) did not notify the competition
authority about the agreement.
A Slovenian producer of washers is subject to a vertical restraint by a
Romanian customer. In general these restraints appear in cases "where the customer is
important enough for" the firm. Interestingly the company has a fairly advanced (if
erroneous) view on the nature of these restraints:
"[The] vertical restraints are in principle not formalised in some formal
agreement but is informal as a kind of gentlemen's agreement. This is eased by
the fact that [the Company's] sales are relatively concentrated on a smaller
number of customers with whom the company has long established business
relations. Although the gentlemen's agreements make the practical imposition
of restraints less sure, on the other hand it eliminates any potential problems of
being accused of using restrictive business practices."
5 Harmonisation and competition culture
Our analyses illustrate a number of insights. First, violations of EU and candidate
country competition rules on vertical restraints do take place. Our survey suggests that
a substantial number (15 per cent) of exclusive agreements are not easily defended on
efficiency grounds (by technology transfer). We do not imply that all of these would
be deemed illegal if they were investigated: they might fall below the threshold of de
minimis rules or be innocent for reasons that the statistics do no reveal. Furthermore,
it may well be that the car component industry is not representative for the business
environment as a whole. However, the case studies reveal that not all are innocent.
Second, they go undetected. Whether this is rare or frequent is anyone’s guess.
What is important is that no-one seems to be aware of these infringements. This
obviously makes it rational for the firms involved not to care about the competition
rules regarding vertical restraints. Fingleton et al. (1996, chap.6) reported that
competition authorities in Central Europe were swamped by complaints about unfair
bargains in contract relationships. We do not wish to re-instate such a regime but note
that to the extent that the competition authorities of the candidate countries wish to
take anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints seriously, their notification
provisions make a lot of sense: unlike with abuse of dominance, merger control, and
state aid, effective supervision of vertical restraints is not going to work if it relies
exclusively on ex-officio monitoring and investigations of complaints. In other words,
a minimum of cooperation from market participants is required. It may be that the
European Union can make do without notification of such agreements because firms
in the EU have a long experience based on the Commission’s and the Court’s practice
of determining notified cases. But many firms in the candidate countries clearly lack
this experience.
Third, firms in Central Europe are either ignorant or suspicious of competition
law, at least as far as vertical restraints are concerned. Ignorant, because they often
simply do not know what the rules are. And suspicious, because our interviews
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indicate that firms regard notification – let alone complaints – much like a gang of
street smarts views ratting to the police.
This has two consequences. To judge the candidate countries’ readiness for
accession, more must be done than simply look at their body of law and at their
administrative capacities. The European Commission’s Progress Reports generally
profess confidence that the harmonisation of procedures in antitrust policy – namely,
what do you do? – is complete (Commission, 2000a-j). But our analysis shows that
the harmonisation of processes – how do you do it?– is at this stage of legal
alignment perhaps more important. The Commission’s focus on procedures rather
than on processes goes counter to its attempt to upgrade economic analysis in judging
vertical restraints. This is because one can a alyse only what one knows. If firms do
not inform authorities about vertical restraints, competition offices in principle can
beef up policing. But this is neither desirable nor likely feasible.
The larger point is that institutions and rules alone do not make a market work
well (see also Dutz and Vagliasindi, 2000). In addition this takes knowledge of the
rules as well as incentives to comply with them. Rules that are neglected because
firms do not know them and rules that are not enforced do not matter! De-
emphasising the legalistic character of competition law in favour of an approach that
focuses on the economic effects of inter-firm practices is still only half way to a
modern anti-trust policy. The other half requires an active competition culture. This
suggests that both the EU and the candidate countries may prepare accession more
effectively if they add a third pillar to legal alignment and practical enforcement of
competition policy, namely business involvement in the sense of managers that are
educated about and perceive a stake in competitive markets. This, in turn, means that
for the candidate countries merely to copy the BER (Block Exemption Regulation)
makes little sense. Much more importantly, they should think about how to make
firms aware of the rules. Otherwise harmonisation won’t work.
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www.antimon.gov.sk/default_a.htm.
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Table A1.— Country-specific evidence on exclusive agreements
and technology transfer
Pct. of country totalNumber of different exclusive agreements






































































































































































































Table A2. – Country-specific use of ECR and TTC among the firms
Per cent of country total Exclusivity requested by customer?

























































































Table A3. – Country-specific use of ERS and TTS among the firms
Per cent of country total Exclusivity requested from supplier?
TT to supplier? No Yes TOTAL
No
Poland
Czech R.
Hungary
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
ALL
57.7%
36.4%
67.4%
14.3%
58.1%
23.1%
50.1%
5.4%
1.1%
5.8%
-
-
3.8%
3.1%
63.1%
37.5%
73.3%
14.3%
58.1%
26.9%
53.3%
Yes
Poland
Czech R.
Hungary
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
ALL
31.5%
55.7%
26.7%
82.1%
36.5%
69.2%
42.4%
5.4%
6.8%
-
3.6%
5.4%
3.8%
4.4%
36.9%
62.5%
26.7%
85.7%
41.9%
73.1%
46.7%
TOTAL
Poland
Czech R.
Hungary
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
ALL
89.2%
92.0%
94.2%
96.4%
94.6%
92.3%
92.5%
10.8%
8.0%
5.8%
3.6%
5.4%
7.7%
7.5%
111
88
86
28
74
26
413
